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COMMENTS
Preparing the World for the Child: California's
New Child Sexual Abuse Law
INTRODUCTION
Child sexual abuse' has recently gripped the nation's attention.
The increase in reports and the subsequent increase in legal action
have transformed a formerly unobtrusive event 2 into a new cru-
sade.3 The insidious 4 and sexual nature of the crime, combined
with its victims being members of a protected class of society,5 has
fueled a unified and organized' attack against those who sexually
prey7 on children.
The nature of sexual child abuse, however, has made a swift
victory impossible. Major studies have shown that in most cases
children are sexually abused by someone they know and trust such
as a parent, parent figure, or relative., Additionally, studies show
1. "Child sexual abuse," while it could entail physical abuse, is distinct from what is
referred to as simply child abuse which involves physical abuse without a sexual compo-
nent. J. BULKLEY, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING LEGAL INTERVENTION IN IN-
TRAFAMILY CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES 105 (1982).
2. One study showed that only six percent of all cases are reported. Summit and
Kryso, Sexual Abuse of Children" A Clinical Spectrum, 48 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 238
(1978).
3. "[S]exual abuse of children has provided the subject matter for the witch-hunt of
the eighties." Graham, Difficult Times for the Constitution: Child Testimony Absent
Face-to-Face Confrontation, THE CHAMPION, Aug. 1985, at 18.
4. "Many of the offenses took place in a home ... committed by men previously
known to the girls as friends, casual acquaintances, neighbors, or relatives." D.
MACNAMARA & E. SAGARIN, SEX, CRIME AND THE LAW 71 (1977). Most perpetrators are
men; the average age of the abuser is thirty-five, with only one-sixth over fifty. Id. at 70.
5. For example, minors are limited in their capability to contract (CAL CIV. CODE §
1556 (Deering 1971)); prohibited from certain types of employment (CAL LAD. CODE §
1308 (Deering Supp. 1986)); and cannot be given the death penalty (CAL PENAL CODE §
190.5 (Deering 1985)).
6. Goldzband and Renshaw, Accusations of Sexual Abuse: A New Problem, re-
printed In THE SEXUAL OFFENDER AND THE CHILD VICTIM: A SYMPOSIUM FOR MENTAL
HEALTH AND LAW PROFESSIONALS (Nov. 1985) (available from Academy of San Diego
Psychologists) [hereinafter cited as THE SEXUAL OFFENDER AND THE CHILD VICTIM]. This
symposium was held on November 22, 1985 at the University of San Diego School of Law.
7. Those who have erotic and libidinal love for children are technically known as
pedophiles. A pedophile has a major or near exclusive interest in children as sexual part-
ners. Only one fourth to one third of convicted child molesters are found to be pedophiles.
D. MACNAMARA & E. SAGARIN, supra note 4, at 66, 73.
8. Major studies have shown that in as many as 80% of the cases, children are sexu-
ally abused by those they know and trust. Cerkovnik, The Sexual Abuse of Children:
Myths, Research, and Policy Implications, 89 DIcK. L. REV. 691, 702 (1985) (citing K.
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that child sexual abuse by family members is less likely to be re-
ported than child sexual abuse by strangers. 9 Add to these facts
the reality that many sexually abused children are too young to
understand or to communicate their victimization adequately to
the authorities10 and the probability of successful prosecution is
dim.
The reality, however, is that sex cases generally have a tradition
of pretrial prejudice and of a guilty verdict on relatively slight
evidence, particularly when the accuser is a child." Even if an
accusation does not end in a conviction, or even a trial, the ac-
cused virtually always suffers public shame, often resulting in
strained marital relations.12 The accused may sometimes lose his
or her job.13 Additionally, the accused may spend huge sums of
money in the defense of a serious felony charge which ultimately
is found to be unsubstantiated or false. 4 Consequently, a conflict
has arisen between the competing goals of protecting the accused
and protecting the accuser.
California has responded to the wake of sensational disclosures
of widespread child sexual abuse by enacting Penal Code section
1347.15 This new statute allows children ten years old or younger
to testify via two-way closed-circuit television. 16 Proponents of this
unusual procedure contend that it will make testifying less trau-
matic for the child.17 Moreover, if the child feels safe and com-
fortable, she18 will more accurately relate her story and more ef-
MacFarlane, "Sexual Abuse of Children" (1978)).
9. Cerkovnik, supra note 8, at 702.
10. Comment, Criminal Procedure-Child Witnesses-The Constitutionality of Ad-
mitting the Videotape Testimony at Trial of Sexually Abused Children, 7 WHITTIER L.
REV. 639, 640 (1985).
11. D. MACNAMARA & E. SAGARIN, supra note 4, at 77.
12. Renshaw, When Sex Abuse is Falsely Charged, THE CHAMPION, Jan./Feb.
1986, at 8, 9.
13. Id.
14. Two former McMartin Preschool teachers say that eighteen months of legal bat-
ties have "wiped out their finances and made them objects of unspeakable contempt." One
of them has had legal expenses in excess of $200,000. L.A. Daily J., Sept. 30, 1985, at 2,
col. 5.
15. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347 began as Senate Bill 46. The bill was authored by
Senator Art Torres (D-Los Angeles), and became law on May 20, 1985.
16. CAL PENAL CODE § 1347(b) (Deering Supp. 1986).
17. Coppel, An Analysis of the Legal Issues Involved in the Presentation of a
Child's Testimony by Two-Way Closed-Circuit Television in Sexual Abuse Cases, in PA-
PERS FROM A NATIONAL POLICY CONFERENCE ON LEGAL REFORMS IN CHILD SEXUAL
ABUSE CASES 243 (1985).
18. "For every ten girl victims there is one boy victim." J. BARKAS, VICriMS 130
(1978). But see Groth, Hobson and Gary, The Child Molester: Clinical Observations, re-
printed in S. SMITH, CHILDREN'S STORY: CHILDREN IN CRIMINAL COURT 89 (1985), where
the authors found that, "[p]readolescent boys and girls are at equal risk of being sexually
victimized .... ; and Mann, The Assessment of Credibility of Sexually Abused Children
in Criminal Court Cases, 1985 AM. J. FORENSIC PYSCHIATRY 9, where the author stated
1986]
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fectively aid in the prosecution of the abuser. 9
Notwithstanding its noble intentions, California's new statute
does not solve the emotional and legal problems inherent in sexual
child abuse cases. Further, the statute threatens basic tenets of
criminal justice such as the defendant's constitutional 20 right to
confront complaining witnesses.2' In part I, this Comment will ex-
plore the statute itself including its procedure, legislative history,
and criteria for use.22 Part II will examine the actions other states
have taken in addressing this issue." Finally, Part III will criti-
cally examine the actual benefit which section 1347-type legisla-
tion gives to child witnesses and will conclude with suggestions for
future disposition of sexual child abuse cases.24
I. CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE SECTION 1347
The reasons behind California's new law are various. Before
discussing why California adopted Penal Code Section 1347, how-
ever, identifying at this point just what the newly enacted statute
entails is helpful.
that prior to age eighteen, one out of four girls and one out of five boys have had sexual
contact with an adult.
19. This conclusion is premised on the fact that "[t]here is usually no medical evi-
dence to corroborate the crime. Children who are victims of sexual abuse by a parent or
adult family member are rarely forcibly assaulted." J. BULKLEY, supra note 1, at 113.
20. Constitutional themes which recur thoughout this Comment will not be treated
in depth as they are beyond the scope of this work. For a discussion of these issues, see
generally Coppel, supra note 17, and Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse
Prosecutions: Two New Innovations, 98 HARe. L. REv. 806 (1985).
21. The confrontation clause of the sixth amendment provides: "[T]he accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him. . . ." US. CONST.
amend. VI. The California Constitution states: "The defendant in a criminal trial has the
right.., to be confronted with the witnesses against the defendant." CAL CONsT. art. I, §
15.
The touchstone federal case entitling the defendant to a face-to-face confrontation with
his accuser is United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1979). In Benfield, the
court, noting the precedents set in Dowell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911), Kirby v.
United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899) and Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, (1895),
stated: "The right of cross-examination reinforces the importance of physical confrontation.
Most believe in some undefined but real way recollection, veracity, and communication are
influenced by face-to-face challenge." 593 F.2d at 821.
California courts have followed this federal lead. See, e.g., Herbert v. Superior Court,
117 Cal. App. 3d 661, 172 Cal. Rptr. 850 (1981).
Many law review articles have been written on the accused's right of confrontation in the
face of videotaped or closed-circuit testimony. See Symposium Issue: Child Abuse and the
Law, 89 DICK. L. REV. 577; Comment, Libai's Child Courtroom: Is it Constitutional?, 7 J.
Juv. L. 31, 31-39 (1983); Note, supra note 19, at 806-27; Comment, supra note 10.
22. See infra notes 25-111 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 112-28 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 129-37 and accompanying text.
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A. The Procedure
Penal Code section 1347 allows the court in any criminal pro-
ceeding, upon motion, to order the testimony of a child 10 years
old or younger to be taken by contemporaneous examination via
two-way closed-circuit television.25 The child's testimony must in-
volve the recitation of facts surrounding an alleged sexual of-
fense.2 6 Section 1347 allows the defendant to subject the child's
testimony to contemporaneous cross-examination.2
According to that code section, the child will testify from a lo-
cation other than the courtroom, and his or her image will be
transmitted live to the judge, jury and counsel.28 In the room with
the child will be a support person,29 a non-uniformed bailiff and a
court representative."0 Separate videotapes will record the images
of the child and the support person.3" The child's examination is
taken under oath and the defendant's image is transmitted live to
the witness via two-way closed-circuit television.32
25. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347(b) (Deering Supp. 1986).
26. Id. § 1347(b)(1).
27. Id. § 1347(b).
28. Id.
29. Id. § 1347(e). The support person is designated pursuant to CAL PENAL CODE §
868.5 (Deering Supp. 1986), which states in pertinent part:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a prosecuting witness 16 years of
age or under in a case involving a violation of Section 243.4, 261, 273a, 273d, 285,
286, 288, 288a, 289, or 647a or a violation of Subdivision (1) of Section 314, shall
be entitled for support to the attendance of a parent, guardian, or sibling of his or
her own choosing, whether or not a witness, at the preliminary hearing and at the
trial, during the testimony of the prosecuting witness. The person so chosen shall
not be a person described in Section 1070 of the Evidence Code unless the person
is related to the prosecuting witness as a parent, guardian, or sibling and does not
make notes during the hearing.
(b) If the person so chosen is also a prosecuting witness, the prosecution shall
present, on noticed motion, evidence that the person's attendance is both desired
by the prosecuting witness for support and will be helpful to the prosecuting wit-
ness. Upon that showing, the court shall grant the request unless information
presented by the defendant or notice by the court establishes that the support
person's attendance during the testimony of the prosecuting witness would pose a
substantial risk of influencing or affecting the content of that testimony.
(c) The testimony of the person so chosen who is also a prosecuting witness shall
be presented before the testimony of the prosecuting witness. The prosecuting wit-
ness shall be excluded from the courtroom during the person's testimony. When-
ever the evidence given by the person would be subject to exclusion because given
before the corpus delicti has been established, the evidence shall be admitted sub-
ject to the court's or the defendant's motion to strike that evidence from the rec-
ord if the corpus delicti is not later established by the testimony of the prosecuting
witness.
In addition, the support person will be instructed not to coach, cue, or influence the testi-
mony of the minor. Id. § 1347(d)(4).
30. Id. § 1347(e) The court representative is appointed by the court after consulta-
tion with the prosecution and defense.
31. Id. These tapes will be destroyed after five years. Id. § 1346(g).
32. Id. § 1347(h). This ostensibly preserves the defendant's right of confrontation.
4
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When the court orders the testimony of a minor to be taken via
two-way television, the court must first make a brief statement on
the record, outside of the jury's presence, of the reasons support-
ing the order.3 3 The court then must tell the jury members that
"they are to draw no inferences from the use of two-way closed-
circuit television as a means of facilitating the testimony of the
minor."34 Also outside of the jury's presence, the court must in-
struct counsel that they may make no comment during trial re-
garding the use of the two-way television precedures.35
B. Legislative Intent
Prior to section 1347's enactment, existing California law con-
tained provisions for:
(i) videotaping the preliminary hearing testimony of a minor
15 years of age or less in specified cases and for admission of the
videotape as evidence at trial;36(ii) excluding the public by using methods including closed-
circuit television or videotaped depositions at a preliminary
hearing in certain cases involving sex offenses;37(iii) prohibiting state and local governments from requiring
and requesting a complaining witness in a sex offense case to
take a polygraph examination;38 and(iv) prohibiting trial courts from ordering complaining wit-
nesses to submit to psychiatric or psychological examinations to
assess credibility.39
In iddition, Penal Code section 288(c) requires the court to con-
trol the mode of interrogation of a witness and to consider the
needs of a child victim of a lewd or lascivious act."' Under section
1347, the court must do whatever is necessary and constitutionally
permissible "to prevent psychological harm to the child. '41
The intent of the California legislature in enacting section 1347
is summarized in that section's opening line:
33. The statement shall set forth the reasons "with sufficient specificity to permit
meaningful review and to demonstrate that discretion was exercised in a careful, reasona-
ble, and equitable manner." Id. § 1347(d)(1).
34. Id. § 1347(d)(2).
35. Id. § 1347(d)(3).
36. Id. § 1346.
37. CAL PENAL CODE § 868.7 (Deering 1983).
38. Id. § 637.4.
39. CAL PENAL CODE § 1112 (Deering Supp. 1986).
40. CAL. PENAL CODE § 288(c) (Deering 1985) provides: "In any arrest or prosecu-
tion under this section the peace officer, the district attorney, and the court shall consider
the needs of the child victim and shall do whatever is necessary and constitutionally per-
missible to prevent psychological harm to the child victim."
41. S.B. 46, at 2. The bill's author notes that existing law defines oral examination as
being in the presence of the jury and secures to a defendant the right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses.
[Vol. 23
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It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this section to pro-
vide the court with discretion to employ unusual court proce-
dures to protect the rights of a child witness, the rights of the
defendant, and the integrity of the judicial process. . . This
discretion is intended to be used selectively when the facts and
circumstances in the individual case present compelling evidence
of the need to use these uriusual procedures."2
On signing the bill into the law, Governor George Deukmejian43
said that it "provides a means to help ease the trauma to some
children who face having to reopen the terrible memories of sex-
ual abuse in a court of law.""
With all the existing California provisions geared toward assist-
ing the child witness in sexual abuse cases, what prompted the
legislature to adopt the "unusual court procedures" now contained
in California Penal Code section 1347? Perhaps the two most cat-
alytic events triggering that code section's enactment were the
McMartin Pre-School45 and Hochheiser cases.46
On March 22, 1984, seven employees of the McMartin Pre-
School were arrested and charged with 208 counts of child moles-
tation.47 The nature and number of allegations made the case es-
pecially notorious, and therefore politically remarkable.4 8 Parents
of the allegedly abused children lobbied the legislataure to enact a
closed-circuit testimony provision to enable their children to avoid
exposure to what the parents viewed as potentially harmful court-
room proceedngs.
Meanwhile, in November 1984, the California Court of Appeal
refused to allow the use of closed-circuit television for the nine
and ten-year-old complaining witnesses in Hochheiser v. Superior
Court.4 9 The prosecutor requested the use of the two-way televi-
sion system on the day of trial.50 Defense counsel objected and
filed a writ of prohibition, stating that the procedure would de-
42. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347(a) (Deering Supp. 1986) (emphasis added).
43. Former Attorney General of California, elected Governor in 1982 and re-elected
in 1986.
44. Roberts, Governor Signs "McMartin" Bill into Law, L.A. Daily J., May 21,
1985, at 2, col. 3-4.
45. This case has yet to go to trial.
46. Hochheiser v. Superior Court, 161 Cal. App. 3d 777, 208 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1984).
47. L.A. Daily J., Sept. 30, 1985, at 20, col. 1. Charges have been dismissed against
five of the seven defendants because of insufficient evidence. Nat'l L.J., Feb. 3, 1986, at 42,
col. 4.
48. The allegations included animal slaughtering to assure the children's silence and
sexual games such as "naked move star," in which a young boy supposedly took off his
clothes in front of cameras. Authorities later claimed that the pre-school existed solely for
the purposes of sexual abuse and child pornography. San Diego Union, Oct. 2, 1985, at A-
3, col. 2-3.
49. Hochheiser v. Superior Court, 161 Cal. App. 3d 777, 208 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1984).
50. Id. at 781, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 275.
1986]
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prive the defendant of a fair trial and that the notice was not
timely.51 The prosecution then presented the testimony of the two
boys' parents to show that the closed-circuit television was neces-
sary to prevent psychological harm to the two boys.52 The trial
court allowed the procedure based on the "inherent power of the
court" to regulate its proceedings."
Hochheiser presented an issue of first impression in California
concerning the "power of the trial court to promulgate radically
new procedures" 54 regarding the testimony of minors in sex of-
fense cases. The appellate court found that the trial court had
erred in ordering the use of closed-circuit television and hence is-
sued a peremptory writ of prohibition. 5 The court reasoned that
authorizing closed-circuit testimony should be left to the "consid-
ered judgment of the Legislature." 56
The court was concerned primarily about the lack of physical
confrontation when such a procedure is used.57 The court was also
concerned that the procedure might adversely affect the presump-
tion of innocence "by creating prejudice in the minds of the jurors
towards the defendant similar to that created by the use of physi-
cal restraints on a defendant in the jury's presence."58 Finally, the
court reasoned that neither Evidence Code section 765, 59 nor Pe-
nal Code section 288(c)60 emcompassed such testimony.6 1 The
51. Id.
"2. Id. The father of ten-year-old T.B. testified that his son was "shy about his pri-
vate parts" and had said he did not want to talk about the incident in front of a lot of
people. After the preliminary hearing, T.B. experienced several nights of nightmares and
bed-wetting which had since tapered off. His father had not talked with T.B. about testify-
ing since that time, over a year earlier.
The mother of eight-and-a-half to nine-year-old S.W. testified that her son was "totally
distraught" after testifying at the 1982 preliminary hearing. He reverted back to baby-like
behavior such as wanting to wear diapers. When she approached S.W. about testifying in
June 1984, he "burst into tears" and told her that he would not go back to court and did
not know anything. He also seemed to be eating less.
53. Id. at 782-83, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 276.
54. Malkus & Oliva, Controlling the Courtroom, San Diego Trial Law. A. Trial Bar
News, Oct. 1985, at 24.
55. Hochheiser, 161 Cal. App. 3d at 794, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 284.
56. Id. (quoting Reynolds v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 834, 837, 528 P.2d 45, 46,
117 Cal. Rptr. 437, 438 (1974)).
57. Hochheiser, 161 Cal. App. 3d at 786 n.2, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 278 n.2. The court
noted that "a careful reading of the cases [indicates] that physical confrontation is an
element of sixth amendment guarantees."
58. Id. at 787, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 279. The court was also concerned about distortion
of the witness's testimony and the potential that the jury might give more credibility than
is desired to the televised testimony. Id. at 786-87, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 279.
59. CAL EvID. CODE § 765(a) (Deering 1986) provides: "The court shall exercise
reasonable control over the mode of interrogation of a witness so as to make such interro-
gation as rapid, as distinct, and as effective for the ascertainment of the truth, as may be,
and to protect the witness from undue harassment or embarrassment."
60. See supra note 40 for the provisions of CAL PENAL CODE § 228(c).
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court held that this Evidence Code section governed only witness
questioning within the courtroom. 2 The court also found that it
could not "imply from the broad, open-ended language in [Penal
Code section 288] subdivision (c) that the Legislature intended
such a fundamental change in . . . law which would abrogate
traditional statutory rights to the presence of the testifying witness
in the courtroom with the defendant."'63
State Senator Art Torres (D-Los Angeles) introduced Senate
Bill 46 to the California state legislature in 1984, responding pri-
marily to the McMartin uproar and to the Hochheiser decision.
"Of the dozens of so-called protection bills which flooded the leg-
islature [that] session, [Senate Bill] 46 was among the most re-
strained in the blows struck against due process guarantees.""
Another bill which would have permitted the use of hearsay testi-
mony by children age ten and under in cases where there is cor-
roboration was rejected by the Public Safety Committee.65 After a
great deal of debate and amendment,6 6 Senate Bill 46 became
California Penal Code section 1347 .67
C. Criteria for Use of TV Testimony
In order to implement the unusual procedures of Penal Code
section 1347, the court must first make all of the following
findings:
(1) The minor's testimony will involve a recitation of the facts of
an alleged sexual offense committed on or with the minor.(2) The impact on the minor of one or more of the factors enu-
merated in subparagraphs (A) to (D), inclusive, is shown by
clear and convincing evidence to be so substantial as to make
the minor unavailable as a witness unless closed-circuit televi-
sion is used.
(A) Threats of serious bodily injury to be inflicted on the minor
or a family member, of incarceration or deportation of the minor
or a family member, or of removal of the minor from the family
or dissolution of the family, in order to prevent or dissuade the
61. Hochheiser, 161 Cal. App. 3d at 788-92, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 280-82.
62. Id. at 789, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 280.
63. Id. at 791, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 282.
64. Semel, Meeting the Challenge of the Child Witness in Sexual Abuse Cases, FO-
RUM, Sept.-Oct. 1985, at 12, 16.
65. Roberts, supra note 44, at 2, col. 2. A.B. 34 was introduced by Sunny Mojon-
nier/R-San Diego. Id. at col. 3.
66. The debate included: (1) the age of the minor; (2) whether to allow cross-exami-
nation; (3) whether to allow victims and witnesses to testify; and (4) the requirement of
clear and convincing evidence to show that the procedure was necesary or that the child
was "unavailable." S.B. 46, at 3-6.
67. "The Senate passed the bill 30-1 and the Assembly approved it 76-1." Roberts,
supra note 44, at 2, col. 2.
1986]
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minor from attending or giving testimony at any trial or court
proceeding or to prevent the minor from reporting the alleged
sexual offense or from assisting in criminal prosecution.
(B) Use of a firearm or any other deadly weapon during the
commission of the crime.
(C) Infliction of great bodily injury upon the victim during the
commission of the crime.
(D) Conduct on the part of the defendant or defense counsel
during the hearing or trial which causes the minor to be unable
to continue his or her testimony. 8
In drafting the statute, the legislature intended that the court
exercise its discretion in invoking section 1347 only when "the
facts and circumstances in the individual case present compelling
evidence of the need to use these unusual procedures." 69 In doing
so, the court necessarily must balance the rights of the defendant
against the need both to protect a child witness and to preserve
the court's "truthfinding function. '70 As a practical matter, how-
ever, nearly every child under eleven who is a victim of sexual
abuse and who is deemed competent to testify7 could qualify to
give his or her testimony via two-way closed-circuit television.
Part one of the test for implementation of section 1347 proce-
dures is necessarily found in every sex offense case: It is tautologi-
cal that the testimony of a sexual child abuse victim should in-
clude a recitation of the facts of an alleged sexual offense.
Part two of the test, while apparently limiting the implementa-
tion of closed-circuit testimony, remains so general as to allow
nearly all children to come within the parameters of Penal Code
section 1347. The child witness need meet only one of the four
factors (A, B, C, or D) to satisfy part two of the test.
68. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347(b) (Deering Supp. 1986) (emphasis added).
69. Id. § 1347(a).
70. Id.
71. CAL PENAL CODE § 1347 does not alter the basic requirements of witness com-
petency as given by CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 700-704. (Deering Supp. 1986). The pertinent
portions of the Evidence Code, §§ 700 and 701 are as follows:
§ 700. General rule as to competency
Except as otherwise provided by statute, every person is qualified to be a witness
and no person is disqualified to testify to any matter.
§ 701. Disqualification of witness
A person is disqualified to be a witness if he is:
(a) Incapable of expressing himself concerning the matter so as to be under-
stood, either directly or through interpretation by one who can understand him; or
(b) Incapable of understanding the duty of a witness to tell the truth.
Note that there is no minimum age requirement for witnesses in the Evidence Code.
[Vol. 23
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Factor A
The first factor of part two addresses the various types of pres-
sure put on the child not to report sexual abuse or, once reported,
not to testify.72 The majority of child sexual abuse victims is in-
cluded in this broad subdivision. The types of coercion listed by
the legislature mirror the very reasons why child sexual abuse
often goes unreported. Part of the "sexual abuse paradigm"73 is
that the abuser threatened or somehow coerced the victim to re-
main silent about his or her sexual involvement. 4 Therefore, more
often than not, there will be evidence that such coercion has
occurred.
Interestingly, the language of the statute does not expressly
limit "threats" to pressure put on the child by the defendant. That
a family member of the child, for instance, an older sibling or
mother, 75 might try to prevent the child from testifying to pre-
serve what is left of the family is not uncommon. In such a case, it
would be illogical and unfair to then implement procedures which
"penalize" 76 the defendant for something he did not do.
A child's experience not fitting within the ambit of factor A
likely would occur where (a) the abuser rewarded the victim for
nondisclosure," or (b) the child's own misunderstanding of the
abuse prevented him or her from coming forward.7 8 In the former
situation, the abuser appears to be the model parent or friend to
the child. Thus, no threats are needed to keep the child silent
about the deviant part of their relationship. In the latter situation,
the child would be either too young or otherwise incapable of un-
derstanding the abuse, and most likely incompetent79 to testify at
all.
72. Factor "A" does not lend itself to an easy description because of its breadth.
Indeed, this is part of the problem with it as a criterion.
73. It would be impossible to identify a set of signs from which to tell whether a
particular child is "at risk" of sexual molestation. The best we can do is formulate a model
or paradigm, which includes: frequent occurrence within a family generation after genera-
tion, unwillingness of the mother to accept the fact that incestuous molestation has taken
place and threatening of the child to maintain his or her silence. S. SMITH, CHILDREN'S
STORY: CHILDREN IN CRIMINAL COURT 2-6 (1985).
74. J. BULKLEY, supra note 1, at 113.
75. "The mother will often side with the man and do everything possible to under-
mine the child." She, too, was often abused as a child. S. SMITH, supra note 73, at 3.
76. While not a "penalty" as penalities usually are defined, § 1347's requirement of
a special jury instruction, etc., show that there is a real danger that the televised testimony
procedure prejudices the defendant.
77. Child molesters often buy silence. These payoffs are often seen by the outside
world as signs of a loving relationship, thereby reinforcing the molesting situation. S.
SMITH, supra note 73, at 5.
78. These children would probably have a difficult time meeting the threshold wit-
ness requirements of the Evidence Code as well. See supra note 71.
79. See supra note 71 for the provisions of the CAL EVID. CODE dealing with the
competency of witnesses.
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Factors B and C
At first glance, the second and third factors of part two appear
to preclude the use of closed-circuit television for many children.
Child sexual abuse, as previously mentioned, is usually perpe-
trated by a person close to the child who has the child's trust.8"
Therefore, the use of a firearm or other deadly weapon or the in-
fliction of great bodily injury upon the victim rarely occurs in
child sexual cases. 8'
The prosecution, however, can make arguments which could
greatly enlarge the application of these two factors. First, almost
anything can be considered a deadly weapon if the perpetrator in-
tends it to be such.82 Case law is replete with circumstances where
a seemingly innocent object has been considered a deadly
weapon. 83 To a small child, could the accused's hands be consid-
ered deadly weapons?
Second, and even more ambiguous than the term "deadly
weapon," is the notion of "serious bodily injury" in the context of
child sexual abuse cases. For example, would the injury caused by
the vaginal or anal penetration of a small child be deemed part of
the offense? 84 Or would it also, for the purposes of Penal Code
section 1347, be considered serious bodily injury? Similarly, what
if, as a consequence of the molestation, the child contracts a
veneral disease? 85 Given the protection afforded the child within
Penal Code section 1347, the above examples could be considered
"serious bodily injury," and as a result, many more children
would be able to testify via closed-circuit television. 86
In sum, the first three factors of part two seem over-encompass-
80. See supra note 4.
81. There is a small percentage (less than 3 percent) of molestors who may be de-
scribed as "sadistic," in whom aggression is paired with sexual arousal. Adams, Molestor
Myths and Stereotypes: Understanding Child Sexual Abuse, FORUM, May-June, 1985, at
11.
82. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 245 (Deering 1984).
83. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). Deadly weapons range from
guns to knives to baseball bats to rope.
84. Child sexual abuse offenses occur when the following statutes are violated: CAL
PENAL CODE § 261.5 (Deering 1985) (statutory rape); § 285 (Deering 1985) (incest); §
286 (Deering Supp. 1986) (sodomy); § 288 (Deering 1985) (lewd and lascivious acts); §
288a (Deering Supp. 1986) (oral copulation); and § 289 (Deering Supp. 1986) (penetra-
tion of genital or anal opening by a foreign object).
85. Many times, the symptoms of gonorrhea, syphilis and herpes are the unfortunate
results of abuse which lead family members, school teachers or doctors to discover the
sexual abuse of a child. That no cases of AIDS have been reported as transmitted through
child sexual abuse is interesting to note. THE SEXUAL OFFENDER AND THE CHILD VICTIM,
supra note 6.
86. Many of these questions will be answered in future cases; however, presently
there is such uncertainty that § 1347 will be available in an extraordinary number of trials.
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ing and ambiguous. If greatly amended and clarified, they could
perhaps serve as adequate criteria for the use of section 1347. For
instance, if factor A were limited only to coercion of the child by
the defendant, then that criterion would be more consistent with
the legislature's goal of protecting the child from further ill treat-
ment by the defendant. The final factor, however, is not so easily
reformed. As drafted, the last criterion is so outrageous-and con-
stitutionally suspect-that it should be deleted entirely. That cri-
terion is factor D.
Factor D
Factor D, the final factor of part two, arguably qualifies any
remaining child witness to testify via two-way television. Factor D
states that "[c]onduct on the part of the defendant or defense
counsel during the hearing or trial which causes the minor to be
unable to continue his or her testimony"87 will terminate the ne-
cessity for the child's in-court testimony and start the cameras
rolling.
The statute gives courts some guidance in making their deci-
sions to permit testimony via television:
In making the determination required by this section, the
court shall consider the age of the minor, the relationship be-
tween the minor and the defendant or defendants, any handicap
or disability of the minor, and the nature of the acts charged.
The minor's refusal to testify shall not alone constitute sufficient
evidence that the special procedure described in this section is
necessary in order to obtain the minor's testimony.88
Nowhere in the statutory guidelines does the legislature explain
what it intended by the word "conduct" when referring to the de-
fendant and defense counsel in factor D. Therefore, practically
speaking, what conduct will violate factor D?
Imagining conduct by the defendant which would violate sec-
tion 1347(b)(2)(D) is relatively simple. For example, threatening
gestures"9 made by the defendant which impede the child's testi-
mony could be sufficient to cause the use of two-way contempora-
neous examination. But what about facial expressions or even pos-
ture? And what if the child is simply extraordinarily timid? The
problem compounds when considering the role of defense counsel.
If the possibility of television testimony is based on the actions of
the defendant's attorney in addition to the defendant, once again
87. CAL PENAL CODE § 1347 (Deering Supp. 1986) (emphasis added).
88. Id. § 1347(b).
89. Examples of threatening gestures arguably include shaking one's fist in the direc-
tion of the witness, or drawing a finger across the throat.
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the defendant is penalized for something he did not do.2 0
California courts already have within their power the authority
to regulate the behavior of the participants during a trial.9' A
judge may hold the defendant or counsel in contempt of court if
his or her behavior has a deleterious effect on the witness or the
legal process. Additionally, judges may admonish defense counsel
for objectionable behavior.
A greater problem presented by factor D is that the defendant's
constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel 2 is jeop-
ardized. This right places conflicting burdens on defense counsel
in child sexual abuse cases which he or she must reconcile. On one
hand, defense counsel should vigorously cross-examine all wit-
nesses. On the other hand, defense counsel must moderate the
cross-examination or the judge will remove the witness from the
courtroom and from the physical presence of the jury.9"
California appellate courts now give broad review to claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel. The standard formerly was that
so long as the trial was not "a farce or a sham,"9' 4 the defendant's
constitutional rights were deemed satisfied. An appellate court
looked only to the fairness of the trial as a whole.
Today, the standard is much more stringent, and an appellate
court scrutinizes the quality of representation given to the accused
throughout the case. 5 The California Supreme Court in People v.
Pope96 adopted the rule that "a defendant is entitled to the rea-
sonably competent attorney acting as his diligent consciencious
advocate."97 As a result, defense counsel's performance at trial
has been criticized more often and for more reasons, especially
regarding cross-examination. a To be deemed competent, counsel
arguably must thoroughly cross-examine all witnesses.
In many child sexual abuse cases, the alleged victim is the only
90. While attorneys act on behalf of their clients and have authority to legally bind
them, a client can be punished only for his own crime.
91. See CAL EVyD. CODE § 765(a), supra note 59.
92. U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI; CAL CoNsT. art. I, § 15.
93. CAL PENAL CODE § 1347(b)(2)(D) (Deering Supp. 1986).
94. People v. Robillard, 55 Cal. 2d 88, 97, 358 P.2d 295, 300, 10 Cal. Rptr. 167, 172
(1961), rev'd, 60 Cal.2d 631, 388 P.2d 33, 36 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1964).
95. Semel, Avoid "Incompetent Counsel" Claims with Proper Discovery and Investi-
gation, San Diego Trial Law. A. Trial Bar News, Feb. 1984, at 22; see also People v. Pope,
23 Cal. 3d 412, 423, 590 P.2d 859, 864, 152 Cal. Rptr. 732, 737 (1979).
96. 23 Cal. 3d 412, 590 P.2d 859, 152 Cal. Rptr. 732 (1979).
97. Id. at 423, 590 P.2d at 865, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 738 (quoting United States v.
DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
98. Semel, supra note 95, at 22. The scope of the appellate court's review includes
any cross-examination done by counsel at the preliminary hearing as well as at trial. Be-
cause the preliminary hearing is a vital discovery tool, cross-examination of witnesses, in-
cluding the alleged victim, should be thorough.
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witness against the accused, so vigorous cross-examination is cru-
cial to a diligent defense. However, the threat of televised testi-
mony likely will hamper counsel's efforts. "How much is too
much?" is a question which will nag at defense attorneys and per-
haps inhibit their aggressive advocacy. Realistically, the problem
of counsel bullying a child witness is a fear fueled by a few horror
stories,99 but seems to remedy itself through its own inherent pen-
alty.100 Neither judges nor jurors look with smiling approval on an
attorney badgering a child, especially a child who allegedly has
been sexually abused. Therefore, even in the absence of section
1347's provisions, the defense counsel's interest in a successful
cross-examination is best served by launching a tempered attack
on the child's testimony.
Unavailability
Finally, the court's decision permitting the use of closed-circuit
television turns on a finding that the child is otherwise unavaila-
ble.101 When will a child be deemed "unable to continue his or her
testimony?" Given the emotional nature of the testimony coupled
with the strange courtroom surroundings, the child likely will cry
or become quiet during the course of the cross-examination. The
statute says that "the minor's refusal to testify shall not alone"
deem the unusual procedure necessary. 0 2 But, will refusal coupled
with tears plus difficulty in extracting his or her testimony be
enough?
In determining whether the child is "unavailable" to testify in
open court, an examination of Penal Code section 1346(d) is in-
formative.103 The language of section 1346(d) should be applica-
ble, according to the California Attorney General, since section
99. Deputy District Attorney Glenn Stevens, a prosecutor in the McMartin Pre-
School case, alleges that defense counsel "badgered" a child witness. He gives the example
of one child whose direct examination lasted one and one-half hours being cross-examined
for seventeen days. L.A. Daily J., Sept. 30, 1985, at 20, col. 3.
100. "Courtroom procedures in America ... have given rise to an etiquette whereby
one seldom attempts to impeach the testimony of the child for such effort, it is believed,
antagonizes jury or judge and does the defendant more harm than good." D. MAcNAMARA
& E. SAGARIN, supra note 4, at 76.
101. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347(b)(2) (Deering Supp. 1986). See also Memo from
Office of Attorney General John Van de Kamp regarding California Penal Code section
1347, reprinted in THE SEXUAL OFFENDER AND THE CHILD VIcTIM, supra note 6.
102. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347(b)(2) (emphasis added).
103. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1346(d) (Deering Supp. 1986) provides that:
If at the time of trial the court finds that further testimony would cause the victim
emotional trauma so that the victim is medically unavailable or otherwise unavail-
able within the meaning of Section 240 of the Evidence Code, the court may ad-
mit the video tape of the victim's testimony at the preliminary hearing as former
testimony under Section 1291 of the Evidence Code.
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1347 directly follows it, and since section 1346(d) is not specifi-
cally limited to Evidence Code section 240.14 The language of
section 1346(d) expands the scope of unavailability beyond Evi-
dence Code section 240 by including the phrase "medically un-
available" to its definition. A court wishing to use the section 1347
procedures can make the requisite finding of unavailability based
on "some showing" that the child will suffer significant trauma if
required to testify in open court.
Such a radical departure from the normal courtroom procedure
must have more definite criteria for implementation to avoid dero-
gation of any party's rights. While legitimate to reserve some dis-
cretion in the court, the criteria of Penal Code section 1347 are so
easily satisfied that closed-circuit television can almost always be
used. In essence, the court seems to be obliged to grant the use of
the section 1347 measures on the insistence of the prosecutor be-
cause of the liberal and ambiguous language of the statute's crite-
ria for implementation. 10 5 This result is especially unsettling be-
cause the effects of the two-way television testimony are not
known.
D. Unknown Effects of Section 1347
How jurors will react to television testimony is not yet known.
They will be instructed by the court to "draw no inferences from
the use of the two-way closed-circuit television as a means of fa-
cilitating the testimony of the minor." 106 Practically, however,
104. Memo from Office of Attorney General, supra note 101. CAL EVID. CODE §
240(a) and (b) (Deering 1986) state:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subdivision (b), "unavailable as a witness"
means that the declarant is any of the following:
(1) Exempted or precluded on the ground of privilege from testifying concerning
the matter to which his or her statement is relevant.
(2) Disqualified from testifying to the matter.
(3) Dead or unable to attend or to testify at the hearing because of then existing
physical or mental illness or infirmity.
(4) Absent from the hearing and the court is unable to compel his or her attend-
ance by its process.
(5) Absent from the hearing and the proponent of his or her statement has exer-
cised reasonable diligence but has been unable to procure his or her attendance by
the court's process.
(b) A delcarant is not unavailable as a witness if the exemption, preclusion, dis-
qualification, death, inability, or absence of the declarant was brought about by
the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of his or her statement for the
purpose of preventing the declarant from attending or testifying.
105. San Diego Deputy District Attorney Jay Coulter opined that the District Attor-
ney's office would probably use the two-way television testimony "very sparingly," as it
lessens the impact of the child's testimony at trial. Remarks, THE SEXUAL OFFENDER AND
THE CHILD VIcTIM, supra note 6.
106. CAL PENAL CODE § 1347(d)(2) (Deering Supp. 1986).
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drawing no inferences may not be possible for the jurors. In fact,
they may speculate that the defendant must be some sort of a
"monster" if the court will not allow the child to testify in the
same courtroom as the defendant. Such conscious or unconscious
speculations by the jurors translate the presumption of innocence
into a presumption of guilt.107
Additionally, the televised testimony might even be given
greater weight and credibility by virtue of its presentation. There
exists a phenomenon referred to as "status-conferral" where infor-
mation received by television is believed more than if delivered
live.108 The reality is that children sometimes do lie,109 and where
the child is the only witness against the accused, bringing the
child's falsehoods to the judge and/or jury's attention is impera-
tive. The defendant's ability to do so through the strange video
environment, 10 however, may be stifled by Penal Code section
1347.
The effect that the cameras will have on the child and his or her
appreciation of the solemnity of the courtroom proceedings is also
unknown. From a very young age, children are told, "it's only
TV," and that what is on the screen is "just pretend." In the per-
centage of cases where the child's allegations are false, the de-
fendant must uncover the fact that the child is lying. The video
environment, however, may reinforce the child's fantasy, insulat-
ing him or her from the purifying effect of a face-to-face
challenge.1
107. See Hochheiser v. Superior Court, 161 Cal. App. 3d 777, 787, 208 Cal. Rptr.
273, 279 (1984).
108. That the media bestows prestige and enhances authority of an individual is rec-
ognized. Id. at 786-89; 208 Cal. Rptr. at 278-79 (citing Note, The Criminal Videotape
Trial: Serious Constitutional Questions, 55 Ore. L. Rev. 567, 577 (1976) and Miller and
Fontes, Real Versus Reel: What's the Verdict? The Effects of Videotaped Court Materials
on Juror Response, Final Report NSF-RANN GRANT APR75-15815 (Unpub. Mono-
graph 1975) Dept. of Communication, Michigan State Univ. at 235-38).
109. A small percentage, less than ten percent, of child sexual abuse reports are
false. These false reports cause the alleged perpetrators not only humiliation, but also the
expenditures of large sums of money in their defense. The false reports often ultimately
cause the breakup of marriages and the loss of the allged perpetrators' jobs. McGlinn &
Girsh, Why Chldren Make False Accusations of Sexual Abuse, SAN DIEGo TRIAL LAW.
A. TRIAL BAR NEws, Jan. 1986, at 24.
110. Arguably, there are significant differences between testimony via closed-circuit
television and live testimony. The camera lens becomes the jurors' eyes and can affect their
perception of the witness's demeanor and credibility. Hochheiser, 161 Cal. App. 3d at 786,
208 Cal. Rptr. at 278-79.
111. "Most believe that in some undefined but real way recollection, veracity, and
communication are influenced by face-to-face challenge." Herbert v. Superior Court, 117
Cal. App. 3d 661, 670, 172 Cal. Rptr. 850, 855 (1981).
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II. RESPONSES IN OTHER STATES
California is not the first state to adopt the two-way closed-cir-
cuit television procedure. As of this writing, four other states
(Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland and Texas) 112 have enacted simi-
lar statutes, and Ohio has a bill pending." 3 In addition, the New
Jersey Superior Court, without any enabling legislation, recently
has permitted the procedure's use in a child sexual abuse case in
State v. Sheppard.1 4
The New Jersey court did an extensive survey of existing law
before reaching its decision in Sheppard."5 The court also held an
evidentiary hearing before allowing the television testimony. At
this hearing, the state produced numerous witnesses, including a
forensic psychologist, two attorneys with experience in the prose-
cution of child abuse cases, and a video expert all supporting the
use of the video." 6 While defense counsel cross-examined each
witness, he did not introduce any evidence." 7
The Sheppard court reached its decision after employing a bal-
ancing test between the "confrontation right of the defendant
against the 'right' of a child victim to testimonial protection."" 8
The court distinguished United States v. Benfield"19 and Herbert
v. Superior Court 20 to hold that the use of televised testimony
"will not unduly inhibit the defendant's right of confrontation,"
and that the testimony of a child victim of sexual abuse is an ap-
propriate "exception" to the confrontation clause. 2'
Other procedures have been implemented in many states to fa-
112. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.350 (Baldwin Supp. 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
15:283 (West Supp. 1986); MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102 (Supp. 1985);
TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 38.071 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
113. Buckley, Evidentiary and Procedural Trends in State Legislation and Other
Emerging Legal Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 89 DICK. L. REv. 645, 666 (1985).
114. State v. Sheppard, 197 N.J. Super. 433, 484 A.2d 1330 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1984).
115. Id. at . 484 A.2d at 1334-37.
116. Id. at - 484 A.2d at 1332-33.
117. Id. at -, 484 A.2d at 1332. That a similar lack of an affirmative showing by
defense counsel would be deemed "inefective assistance" of counsel in California is a rea-
sonable inference from People v. Pope, 23 Cal. 3d 412, 590 P.2d 859, 152 Cal. Rptr. 732
(1979).
118. Sheppard, 197 N.J. Super. at ., 484 A.2d at 1348.
119. 593 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1979).
120. 117 Cal. App. 3d 661, 172 Cal. Rptr. 850 (1981). The court distinguished Ben-
field because it involved a deposition, an adult victim and a non-sexual charge. The court
distinguished both Benfield and Herbert by citing language in each which left the door
open for appropriate exceptions to the defendant's right of confrontation. State v. Shep-
pard, 197 N.J. Super at ._, 484 A.2d at 1337-38. But see Graham, supra note 3, at 21:
"The seriousness of the offense charged should make us more, not less inclined to secure
the defendant his or her full constitutional protections."
121. Sheppard, 197 N.J. Super. at , 484 A.2d at 1348-49. The court also found
that the defendant had waived his right to confrontation. Id. at -, 484 A.2d at 1345-48.
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cilitate the child's testimony. Fourteen states have statutes provid-
ing for the videotaping of the child's testimony for later use in
courts.122 Aside from constitutional problems, the flaw in that sys-
tem is that in most cases, the videotape is made in a smaller room,
thereby making the child closer to the defendant. Also, a judge is
not present to monitor the behavior of the participants. 23 In some
cases, too, the child may have to go through more depositions
and/or interviews, taking more time than he or she would have
spent on the stand at trial.
A further time-consuming and potentially traumatic experience
for the child is the process by which he or she is found unable to
testify, thereby allowing for the alternatives such as videotape or
two-way television testimony.124 The child may have to endure a
battery of medical and psychiatric tests by examiners for the pros-
ecution and the defense.' 25 Again, the procedure of such examina-
tions is not as easily monitored as are procedures within a court-
room, and are at least as traumatic.
Nine states have hearsay exceptions limited to child sexual
abuse victims. 26 These laws provide that a child's out of court
statement is admissible if the court finds it sufficiently reliable and
the child is either unavailable to testify, or testifies in court.1 27
Again, constitutional questions aside, the child either would be
subjected to the previously mentioned lengthy availability proce-
dure or would be required to testify anyway.
The varied responses of the states in this short survey illustrate
the complexities of this issue and the evasiveness of a quick solu-
tion. However, a hard look must be taken at the actual results of
the procedures because so far, these procedures appear to not help
the child so much as hurt the integrity of the judicial process.'28
122. States which provide for video taping children's testimony include: Alaska, Ari-
zona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Kentucky, Maine, Montana, New Mexico,
South Dakota, Texas and Wisconsin. Courts in Iowa may allow such a procedure in
juvenille proceedings where a petition alleges that the child is in need of assistance. Vir-
ginia allows videotaping procedures in lieu of live testimony if the accused consents. Whit-
comb, Assisting Child Victims in the Courts: The Practical Side of Legislative Reform, in
PAPERS FROM A NATIONAL POLICY CONFERENCE ON LEGAL REFORMS IN CHILD SEXUAL
ABUSE CASES 28 n.12 (1985).
123. Whitcomb, supra note 122 at 19.
124. Id. Not all states require a showing of unavailability for the child. However,
each state using videotaping procedures requires some showing that "justice requires" a
departure from typical proceedings.
125. Id.
126. States which have such hearsy exceptions are Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Indi-
ana, Kansas, Minnesota, South Dakota, Utah, and Washington. Id. at 27.
127. Id. at 17.
128. If our goal truly is to help deserving and helpless victims, why not implement
this procedure for rape victims or other violent crime victims? Surely they are just as
deserving of our sympathetic treatment. The fact is that the trauma experienced by these
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III. DOES SECTION 1347 HELP THE CHILD?
Ostensibly, the purpose of California Penal Code section 1347
is to reduce the trauma of testifying in court for the child wit-
ness.1 29 The argument is that television testimony will reduce the
child's trauma, thereby increasing his or her availability and accu-
racy as a witness. As a result of more accurate testimony, propo-
nents contend that more convictions will be obtained.
That the courtroom experience per se is the cause of further
traumatization of the child victim is, however, far from certain.
Indeed, through sensitive and thorough preparation of the child
for his day in court, the experience may even be a cathartic or a
releasing one.130 Judge Sandra Baxter Smith, herself an abused
child, spoke out in opposition to Senate Bill 46.131 She has written
a book which recommends that before trial, the prosecutor ac-
quaint the child with courtroom procedure and the physical lay-
out. She also suggests that the prosecutor visit an empty court-
room with the child prior to trial and introduce the child to the
judge and the bailiff.132
Research indicates that what is most traumatizing to the child,
besides the actual abuse, is our reaction to the abuse. 33 The
child's trust and confidence in the adults around him or her has
been violated.134 Part of the mending process can and should be-
gin in the courtroom. The child needs to know that adults can
protect him or her through the legal system. Through proper prep-
aration, the child can understand that he or she is safe in the
courtroom, even with the accused present.
Penal Code section 1347, and other statutes like it, do not fully
integrate the child victim into the court proceeding in which he or
she is the main focus. By excluding the child from the regular
court process, the child may think that he or she, rather than the
accused, has done something blameworthy.13 5 Such a failing
victims, children included, need not necessarily be exacerbated by the judicial process. Our
focus, then, should be on helping these victims within the system, not abandoning well-
reasoned principles and procedures in the midst of a hysterical reaction to a certain crime
and victim.
129. Coppel, supra note 17.
130. "Out of a misplaced desire to protect the child, most people, including prosecu-
tors, have a tendency to treat a molestation victim like a china doll." S. SMITH, supra note
73, at 9.
131. Thompson, Arguments Pressed on Measure to Ease Sex Abuse Testimony,
L.A. Daily J., March 5, 1985, at 2, col. 2.
132. S. SMITH, supra note 73, at 15.
133. D. MACNAMERA & E. SAGARIN, supra note 4, at 91-92.
134. The violation of the child's trust, in addition to his or her body, is especially
significant, since the child is most often abused by a person close to him or her. See supra
note 4.
135. S. SMITH, supra note 73, at 13.
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makes all the straining against traditional procedures seen in sec-
tion 1347 useless and counterproductive.
The focus of any sexual child abuse statute must be to prepare
the child for in-court testimony. Penal Code section 1347 touches
upon this idea in subsection (f) where it requires the judge, child,
support person, prosecutor and defense counsel to meet prior to
the two-way testimony. 13 6 The meeting is to explain the court pro-
cess to the child and to allow the attorneys to develop a rapport
with the child, facilitating later questioning. 137 Further, by the
time the child testifies, he or she probably has recounted the testi-
mony several times, also lessening the trauma associated with the
experience of live testimony. The foregoing practices aimed at aid-
ing the child in his or her testimony within the court system must
be encouraged. Meanwhile, legislation such as Penal Code section
1347, which derogates an individual's right to a fair trial, must be
vigourously opposed.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the midst of the current crusade against child sexual abuse,
the California legislature's encactment of Penal Code section 1347
raises some serious constitutional and practical questions about its
effect on the defendant. While well-intentioned, the relief that sec-
tion 1347 offers the child witness is misplaced and unnecessary.
Additionally, the latitude and ambiguity of the statute's criteria
for use of the two-way closed-circuit television procedure will be-
wilder courts and attorneys alike in the statute's application.
Child sexual abuse, by its invisible nature, is a frustrating crime
to address. Hysteria created by our recently increased awareness
of the crime, however, has provoked a hasty and over-reaching
legislative response. What is needed now is calm, rational consid-
eration of solutions which more clearly focus on the practical and
legal issues surrounding child sexual abuse cases.
Juliana B. Humphrey
136. CAL. PENAL CODE, § 1347(0 (Deering Supp. 1986).
137. Id.
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